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Abstract
Most analyses of food-sharing behavior invoke complex explanations such as indirect and delayed benefits for sharing via kin selection and reciprocal altruism. However, food sharing can be a more general phenomenon accounted for by more parsimonious, mutualistic explanations. We propose a game theoretical model of a general sharing situation in which food owners share because it
is in their own self-interest—they avoid high costs associated with beggar harassment. When beggars harass, owners may benefit
from sharing part of the food if their consumption rate is low relative to the rate of cost accrual. Our model predicts that harassment
can be a profitable strategy for beggars if they reap some direct benefits from harassing other than shared food (such as picking up
scraps). Therefore, beggars may manipulate the owner’s fitness payoffs in such a way as to make sharing mutualistic.
Keywords: food sharing, harassment, manipulation, mutualism, game theory

R

ed colobus monkeys (Colobus badius) are an important and
desirable source of protein for chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; Goodall, 1986). A monkey kill attracts beggars that sidle up to the carcass owner, extend their hands, vocalize, and
sometimes grab a scrap of meat. In some situations, the carcass
owner may share with the beggar, breaking off a piece of meat
and handing it to a beggar. Why would the owner give away
food that it could consume?
Food sharing, defined here as joint use of a monopolizable
food source, can be as active as this chimpanzee example or as
passive as a lioness allowing another lioness to feed on her gazelle carcass. Either way, sharing appears to exemplify animal
altruism because one individual accepts a fitness cost while
another receives a fitness benefit. Although sharing may be altruistic at the time of the sharing event, mechanisms such as
kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers,
1971) may provide indirect or delayed benefits to the sharer
(de Waal, 1989; Mitani and Watts, 2001; Perry and Rose, 1994).
In the case of reciprocal altruism, the food is recouped in the
future; thereby making sharing altruistic in the short term but
selfish in the long term. The complicated cognitive machinery
necessary for reciprocal altruism and the presence of relatives
necessary for kin selection make these explanations limited in
the contexts in which they apply. If, however, sharing leads to
an immediate gain for the owner, the situation becomes much
more general, and the more complex, long-term accounts are
unnecessary. Applying resource defense theory (Brown, 1964;
Ydenberg et al., 1986) to our general concept of sharing allows us to consider unexplored explanations of sharing: nonfood owners may harass or interfere with the owner’s feeding,
thereby making it uneconomical to defend the food.
In our chimpanzee example, a beggar may harass the
owner for food by screaming, grabbing at the carcass, or stealing the entire carcass. Often the owner defends its carcass,
thus risking injury and incurring energetic costs, opportunity
costs of slowing feeding rate, and other costs such as attracting more beggars. The beggar faces similar but probably reduced costs of its own when harassing. Therefore, the beggar can influence the net payoffs to the owner by inflicting or
withholding the costs of harassment. If the costs of harassment

are large, sharing might yield a higher net benefit to the owner
than defending. If the beggar alters the owner’s net benefits
enough to change the owner’s optimal strategy, the beggar
has manipulated the payoffs in a way that makes sharing in
the owner’s immediate self-interest (i.e., sharing becomes mutualistic). This manipulative mutualism may occur commonly
in situations in which an actor’s behavior manipulates the net
payoffs for another individual’s cooperative behavior, making
cooperation mutualistic rather than altruistic.
Harassment is a particularly interesting factor that may influence sharing across many situations and taxa because the
beggar’s actions rather than extrinsic forces (such as patch
profitability or travel time) determine the owner’s payoffs and
optimal decision. To analyze the effect of harassment on food
sharing explicitly, we consider an asymmetric game theoretical model. This model is one of only a few models of food
sharing and, more important, one of the first to analyze the potential immediate fitness benefits associated with food sharing.
This model examines the circumstances under which harassment and sharing should occur as well as optimal amounts of
harassment and sharing.
Model
Elements of the sharing/harassment game
Consider two animals: a resource owner, who possesses a
valuable food item of size A (for amount), and a beggar, who
has nothing but is aware of the owner’s food item. Both individuals may forage elsewhere, but this food item offers a
much more valuable fitness benefit per unit time. The owner
may choose to share a portion of its food, say As (for amount
shared). The beggar can choose to harass the owner or leave
him alone. We express the beggar’s harassment intensity as a
rate, c (e.g., measured in calories per second). If the beggar harasses the owner for time t, this costs the beggar ct, and it costs
the owner γ∙ ct (where γ represents a conversion factor that
captures how the beggar’s harassment affects the owner). We
assume that the beggar harasses at intensity c when it is not
busy eating; that is, while the beggar consumes shared food, it
does not or cannot harass.
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Consumption and time available for harassment. We base our
model on time in the sense that we calculate the costs and benefits in terms of the time engaged in various activities and corresponding rates of expenditure during these activities. We
assume that both players consume food at rate r, so a single
animal consuming the entire resource (amount A) will spend
time A/r eating. Next, we express the time available for harassment (Th) in the form

in

B e h a v i o r a l E c o l o g y 13 (2002)

spill, or actively steal parts of the resource. We call these gains
the “noncontingent benefits” of harassment because they do
not depend on the owner’s sharing.
Modeling noncontingent benefits. We suppose that these noncontingent benefits should increase with the intensity of harassment, c, and with the time available for harassment, (A/r)
π(p). With these in mind, we can rewrite our benefit functions
as

(1)
where p represents the proportion of A that the owner shares
(i.e., p = As/A). The function π(p) gives the proportion of the
maximum consumption time (A/r) that is available for harassment. If the owner shares nothing, the beggar has the entire
time available for harassment, so we expect that π(0) = 1. Similarly, if the owner gave everything away, the beggar would
have no time available to harass, so we expect that π(1) = 0.
More generally, we expect that the time available for harassment will decrease as the proportion shared increases.
In this game, then, the owner influences the cost and duration of harassment by controlling As, while the beggar influences the cost of harassment by controlling the harassment intensity c.
The simplest game
Using these assumptions, we can write down the benefits to
the owner (Bo) as a function of the proportion of A shared (denoted by p) and intensity of harassment c:
(2)
The benefits obtained by the beggar, Bb, also depend on the
proportion shared and the intensity of harassment:
(3)

(4)
for the owner, and

(5)
for the beggar, where k represents a factor that measures the
noncontingent benefits of harassment. We assume that the
noncontingent benefits depend on the intensity of harassment (more harassment yields more benefits); thus k is proportional to c. Notice that we subtract the noncontingent gains
from the owner’s benefits because we assume that any benefit that the beggar derives from resource (A) comes at the owner’s expense.
A noncontingent benefit factor k can destabilize the no
share/no harass equilibrium by making harassment worthwhile in its own right. Generally speaking, if k > 1, the beggar
can benefit from harassment regardless of the owner’s behavior, and the beggar’s optimal harassment level (ĉ) should be the
maximum intensity, say c*. If, however, k < 1, the beggar should
not harass, and no share/no harass is the only equilibrium.

In the next step in finding a solution to the game, we ask how
the owner’s choice of p affects the beggar’s optimal c and
vice-versa.
No share/no harass. The simple structure of Bb(p, c) leads us
to a simple conclusion. “ No sharing” (p = 0) and “no harassment” (c = 0) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game as currently constituted (a strong Nash equilibrium is equivalent
to an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS; Maynard Smith,
1982). The beggar’s benefits can only decrease with increasing
harassment intensity (dBb/dc = π (p)/r), meaning that c = 0 is the
beggar’s best option regardless of the owner’s behavior. A nonzero harassment intensity cannot persist because, according to
Equation 3, a beggar that reduces its harassment intensity always increases the benefits it obtains. In turn, this means that
p = 0 represents the owner’s best choice because Bo(p, 0) = A(1
– p) can only decrease with increasing p. This result may seem
disappointing because no sharing and no harassment make for
an uneventful interaction. We believe, however, that it reflects
a common natural situation: when an owner possesses a completely defendable resource, a harasser only incurs costs by
harassing, and it only benefits by recognizing the possessor’s
ownership and moving on to some other possibility.

The owner’s problem and the π(p) function
We expect that the beggar should either not harass (ĉ = 0) or
harass at the maximal intensity (ĉ = c*). To study whether the
owner should share when harassed, and if so, how much, we
need to know more about the function π (p) that specifies the
proportion of the maximum consumption time available for
harassment. In the Appendix we derive a π(p) function using
a stochastic model of the sharing process. This model assumes
that the resource is subdivided into n discrete pieces, with the
owner deciding whether to share each chunk with probability
p. Notice that this subtle reinterpretation of p means that we
should think of p as the average proportion shared, rather than
the realized proportion shared—technically, we now have Ap
= E(As), instead of Ap = As. If the resource is not divisible (n =
1), π (p) decreases linearly with p with a slope of –1[π′(p) = –1;
Figure 1]. For divisible resources (n > 1), the π (p) function has
a slope of –2 at p = 0, increases in slope around p =.5, and has a
slope of 0 at p = 1 (Figure 1). Regardless of divisibility, π(p) always decreases with p.
Optimal sharing when harassed. With the basic properties of
π (p) in hand, we can now show how harassment should affect
the owner’s willingness to share (p). To begin, we differentiate
the owner’s benefit function (Equation 4):

Noncontingent benefits of harassment
This situation can change if harassment has some direct benefits that accrue even if the owner does not share. A harasser
may, for example, collect scraps, cause a distracted owner to

(6)
For indivisible resources (n = 1), π′(p) = –1, and
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Figure 1. The proportion of time available to harass always decreases
with the proportion shared. In the simplest case (Equation A1), the
time available to harass decreases linearly to zero as the owner shares
up to half of the resource, and if the owner shares more than half of
the resource, the beggar never has the opportunity to harass (thick
line). By incorporating resource divisibility or n (equation A2), we
smooth the “kinked” property of the function (all other lines). Increasing divisibility (n) approaches the simpler kinked function.

(7)
We predict, therefore, that the owner should defend an indivisible resource (set p = 0) when

and abandon it (set p = 1) when

The dimensionless term r/c(γ + k) plays an important role
in our model. The numerator includes the food consumption
rate, and the denominator expresses the rate at which costs
accrue during harassment. It represents, therefore, an efficiency—a quotient of rate of benefit gain over rate of cost accrual, and we call it the “ efficiency of consumption when harassed” (ECH).
A divisible resource, however, complicates the analysis. Because π′ (0) = -2, we know that the owner maximizes its benefits at p = 0 (no sharing) when
or

(8)
(9)

That is, the owner should share a divisible resource only
when the ECH is < 2.
Optimal amount to share. If 2 > r/c(γ + k) ≥ 0, then we expect
the owner to share some portion of a divisible resource (Figure 2). Although the complexity of π (p) prevents a general algebraic specification of the optimal p (or p̂), a graphical method
gives a relatively complete characterization. The p̂ value is the
solution of

Figure 2. To determine the optimal proportion to share, we maximize
the owner’s benefit (Bo) as a function of proportion shared (p). If this
maximum is ≤ 0 (negative derivative at p = 0), the owner should not
share (p̂1 = 0). If this maximum is > 0, the owner should share an intermediate amount (p̂ 2 > 0; Equation 10).

(10)
Because π′ (p) is an increasing sigmoid function of p, –π′ (p)
is a sigmoid function that decreases from 2 at p = 0 to 0 at p
= 1. Figure 3 shows how p̂ is related to the term r/c(γ + k). To
find p̂ corresponding to a given r/c(γ + k), we locate r/c(γ + k)
on the vertical axis and trace a horizontal line to the sigmoid
–π(p) curve, then we trace a vertical line to p axis to the find p̂.
This graphical solution gives a relatively complete picture of
the economics of sharing: (1) p̂ increases as r/c(γ + k) decreases;
(2) if r/c(γ + k) ≥ 2, p̂ = 0; (3) if 2 > r/c(γ + k) ≥ 1 then .5 ≥ p̂ > 0; (4)
if 1 > r/c(γ + k) ≥ 0 then 1 ≥ p̂ > .5.
In addition, this graphical solution shows the effect of resource divisibility. For a more divisible resource (higher n), the
sigmoid function will be more abrupt and steplike (Figure 3B),
shifting optimal sharing proportions closer to one-half.
Assembling the pieces. Now that we have a reasonably complete picture of the owner’s and beggar’s options, we assemble these pieces into a game theoretical analysis. The simple
form of the beggar’s problem makes this job easier because we
only have to consider ĉ = 0 and ĉ = c* (where c* is the maximal
intensity). This simplifies things because we only need to consider two possibilities for the owner as well: the best reply to
zero harassment and the best reply to maximal harassment. As
discussed above, the owner’s best reply to no harassment is no
sharing (p̂ = 0). We denote the best reply to maximal harassment as p* and remark that this is given by:
if

(11)
otherwise.

(12)

Since we have two alternatives for each player (ĉ = 0 or ĉ =
c* for the beggar and p̂ = 0 or p̂ = p* ≠ 0 for the owner), we can
gain some intuition about the game using the familiar tool of
the two-by-two game matrix, as shown in Figure 4.
We can now characterize all possible Nash equilibria (share/
no harass is never an equilibrium; Figure 5):
1. No share/no harass. If k < 1, the noncontingent benefits of
harassment are too small, so the beggar should not harass, and as a consequence the owner should not share.
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Figure 5. The three possible Nash equilibria depend on noncontingent
benefits (k) and feeding rate (r).

Figure 3. With low resource divisibility (A), the optimal proportion to
share (p̂ ) is relatively low for a given efficiency of consumption when
harassed (ECH). With high resource divisibility (B), p̂ approaches onehalf for the same ECH.

2. No share/harass. If k > 1 and r/c* (γ + k) ≥ 2, noncontingent
benefits make harassment worthwhile for the beggar, but
sharing does not benefit the owner because of the high
ECH. That is, harassment has little effect on the owner’s
consumption rate.
3. Share/harass. If k > 1 and r/c* (γ + k) < 2, again, noncontingent benefits make harassment worthwhile for the beggar, but now sharing benefits the owner because of high
costs of harassment relative to the rate of food consumption (low ECH).

Model discussion and conclusions
Now we review and highlight several key features and
variables of the model. First, notice that adopting the maximum harassment intensity, c*, does not necessarily mean that
the beggar will spend much time harassing the owner. Our
model assumes that beggars harass only when not consuming shared food. Considering the three equilibria listed above,
then, we would expect the most harassment in the no share/
harass case, the least harassment in the no share/no harass
case, and an intermediate amount in the share/harass case.
The parameter k measures the noncontingent benefits of
harassment and is probably the most important variable in
the model. The condition k > 1 simply means that the benefits of harassment must outweigh the costs even if the owner
does not share. An animal that harasses when k < 1 simply
burns its own resources (and an owner’s best strategy is to
let the harasser do so). Our model’s second key parameter,
the efficiency of consumption when harassed, or ECH [r/c* (γ
+ k)], measures the speed of food intake relative to the cost
rate of harassment. The role of intake rate (r) agrees with in-

Figure 4. Two-by-two game matrix representing the harassment game.
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tuition, for we do not expect sharing of small or easily processed resources.
Given that the resource is divisible (n > 1), the amount of
divisibility does not affect the equilibria outlined above, but
it should affect the proportion shared when sharing occurs.
Our model predicts that the amount shared should approach
one-half as resource divisibility increases (Figure 3). One-half
is special in our model because we assume that both players
feed at the same rate. It follows that if the owner wants to eat
the maximum amount in peace (keeping the beggar occupied
while it eats), then a 50/50 split will achieve this goal.

contingent benefits for non-food owners. They found that
non-food owners tended to harass more (via stealing, stealing attempts, and food manipulation) when the owner could
not completely control the food than when it could control the
food. Unfortunately, the authors did not present data on the
non-food owner’s success rate for obtaining food.

DISCUSSION
Our model explores the effects of harassment on food sharing. For harassment to be profitable, the beggar must receive
benefits for harassing (high k) whether or not the owner shares
(e.g., gathering scraps, stealing small pieces). In the face of this
harassment, an owner may share if harassment sufficiently reduces its feeding efficiency [r/c* (γ + k)].
Importance and implications
Harassment and manipulation
As one of the first models to explicitly examine immediate
benefits of food sharing, we set the stage for more general or
parsimonious explanations of sharing than kin selection and
reciprocal altruism (de Waal, 1989; Perry and Rose, 1994).
Clutton-Brock and Parker (1995) reviewed general forms of
manipulation and punishment in animal societies, but only
two studies provide evidence that harassment influences animal sharing. First, Wrangham (1975) suggested that harassment may play a large role in chimpanzee sharing of colobus
monkey meat after kills. These kills often attracted beggars
that vocalized, used begging hand gestures, and even attacked
the owner (Goodall, 1986; Wrangham, 1975). If the owner
shared part of the food, the recipient usually left, followed by
a small band of beggars. Wrangham (1975) hypothesized that
the owners “paid” the beggars with pieces of food to avoid harassment. More recent evidence indicates that chimpanzees
that harass intensely receive more food than those that harass
less intensely (Gilby IC, unpublished data).
Hauser and Marler (Hauser, 1992; Hauser and Marler,
1993) described an extreme example of harassment affecting
food sharing. In experiments involving rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), Hauser and colleagues provided food to individual monkeys that were out of view of other monkeys. They
found that, when detected by others, monkeys that did not
give food recruitment calls experienced more aggression than
monkeys that called. Calling females consumed more food
than silent females because silent females dropped food while
being chased (Hauser, 1992). The increase in callers’ consumption indicates that calling may be immediately mutualistic.
Noncontingent benefits
Our model emphasizes benefits that beggars receive even if
the owner defends the food; that is, the owner cannot unilaterally defend the entire food source, so harassing the owner
to gather scraps or steal pieces of food may benefit the beggar.
Without these incentives to remain close to the owner, harassment is not profitable, and in the absence of harassment, the
owner has no incentive to share.
Kummer and Cords (1991) conducted experiments on captive long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis), varying non-

Resource divisibility
Our finding that resource divisibility does not affect the
owner’s decision to share is a bit curious. Although it does not
directly influence sharing, divisibility may indirectly influence
the decision to share if it affects the noncontingent benefits of
harassment. We did find, however, that divisibility determines
the proportion of the food source that the owner should share
if it does share: owners should share about one-half of highly
divisible food.
Consider a lioness consuming a freshly killed gazelle. A
single lioness can defend an intact carcass, but when the carcass begins to disintegrate, the lioness may have difficulty defending the entire carcass, and she may allow others to take
small pieces. Elgar (1986) suggested that, upon discovery of a
food source, house sparrows (Passer domesticus) sparrows gave
“chirrup” calls, thereby attracting conspecifics and decreasing
individual predation risk. Interestingly, the sparrows called
more frequently after discovering a divisible food source than
a solid source. Hauser et al. (1993) reported similar results
with chimpanzees: individuals gave more food-associated
calls when consuming a divided watermelon than when consuming an intact watermelon. Perhaps frequent sharing of a
divisible food source is simply a question of sheer monopolizability. Defending multiple food sources may prove much
more difficult than defending a single source.
Latent harassment
In natural situations in which owners defend food before
sharing (such as in chimpanzees), harassment is obvious. In
situations in which the owner shares immediately, however,
blatant harassment may not appear even if the ever-present
threat of harassment maintains the sharing. Of course, latent
harassment may prove difficult to observe in nature, necessitating empirical manipulations of sharing and potential for
harassment. In a related vein, the overt harassment and food
defense may be an information-gathering ritual for both the
owner and beggar; each one gauging the other’s motivation
and resolve (see Ydenberg et al., 1986, for applications of the
war of attrition to resource defense).
Related models
Although few models directly focus on the immediate benefits of food sharing (but see Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000; Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin, 1999), several classes of models
lay the foundation for theoretically exploring the evolution of
food sharing.
Resource defense
Whereas the term “sharing” often evokes thoughts of one
individual actively donating food to another, sharing can be
much more generally defined in terms of two or more individuals consuming a resource that one can monopolize. This
broader concept of sharing encompasses many instances of resource defense. Brown (1964) originally described the “ economic defendability” of territory defense as the circumstances
under which an individual should accept the costs involved
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in defending a territory. Others have extended this work to
the defense of food sources. Ydenberg et al. (1986) modeled
the defense of food sources in a way relevant to this model by
considering the effects of interference (analogous to our harassment) on foraging decisions. Their model predicted that
interference will slow intake rate, thereby making defense uneconomical for individuals that are far from their home and
for those with richer food patches in their home range. The
combined effect of interference and the asymmetries in homerange distance and richness may allow subordinate individuals to feed in patches with dominant individuals or even interfere with and exclude dominant individuals from patches.
Tolerated theft
Blurton Jones (1984, 1986, 1987) argued that an asymmetry
of value based on satiety might be important in tolerated theft
situations. Although the next morsel of food is not very important to the sated owner, it may be very valuable to the hungry
beggar. Because of this decrease in the marginal value of food
during consumption, the owner should tolerate theft of food
by the beggar.
Although this idea provided a valuable foundation for modeling food sharing, the important aspect of behavior in game
theory is the relative value of an individual’s options, not the
value difference between individuals. Blurton Jones mentioned that owners must weigh the costs of defending food, but
never incorporated this idea into the model. Without this key
inclusion, the analysis ignores strategy stability. Winterhalder (1996a, 1996b) continued the marginal analysis of tolerated
theft, but still did not apply a game theoretical approach.
Producer/scrounger games
Our model examines the conditions under which a non-food
owner benefits by harassing an owner and an owner benefits by
sharing with the beggar. The producer-scrounger game (Barnard and Sibly, 1981; Vickery et al., 1991) addresses whether
individuals specialize in either searching for food individually
(producing) or avoiding costs of foraging by parasitizing the
finds of the producers (scrounging); thereby assuming that harassing and sharing occur. Keep in mind, however, that individuals can choose between the two strategies; that is, for any given
foraging bout, an individual is either a producer or scrounger,
but it can choose either strategy in a future bout. Giraldeau and
colleagues have experimentally investigated theory-based predictions on the effects of dominance, resource divisibility, role
specialization, patch departure time, and competition intensity
in a producer-scrounger situation (Beauchamp and Giraldeau,
1997; Giraldeau et al., 1990).
Extensions
Destabilizing the no share/no harass equilibrium
In our model, harassment can only persist when harassing
produces noncontingent benefits for the harasser, and this result has led us to hypothesize that phenomena such as stealing
and scrap collecting are prerequisites to harassment-induced
sharing. We do not, of course, claim that this is the only way
to destabilize the no share/no harass equilibrium, but it does
seem to be a plausible and parsimonious approach. This result
arises in our model because we assume that the beggar’s gains
change linearly with harassment intensity, so that the optimal
harassment intensity must be either the minimum level (0) or
the maximum level (c*). Future work, ideally guided by empirical results, might explore nonlinear benefit functions which
can (in theory) destabilize the no share/no harass equilibrium
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without noncontingent benefits.
Food consumption rate
Food consumption rate (r) is an important parameter in
our model. We assume that the players have similar consumption rates, which means that the amount required to keep a harasser busy is similar to the amount the owner will be able to
eat in peace. In natural situations, consumption rates may be
quite different because of differences in sex, age, or levels of
satiety. Systematic variation in individual consumption rates
may provide an interesting avenue to explore both theoretically and empirically. An informal application of our model’s
logic suggests that differential consumption rates may influence the beggar’s decision to harass and the owner’s decision
to share and how much to share. For example, owners may
be more willing to share with slow eaters (e.g., juveniles who
have not learned efficient food handling techniques) because
they can be kept busy at minimal cost.
N-player game
Our model considers only two players to simplify the problem and to conform to a standard two-by-two game matrix. In
natural situations, however, multiple beggars often surround
an owner. We speculate that including multiple beggars in our
model will increase the overall intensity of harassment, thereby
forcing the owner to share more frequently (any parent knows
it is easier to tolerate harassment from one child than from several children). Chapman and Kramer (1996) found experimentally that as the number of food competitors increased, the owner’s intake rate decreased, guarding success decreased, and
total number of chases peaked at intermediate competitor numbers. The difficulty in analyzing the effects of beggar number
on sharing lies in how to distribute the food in such a way to
minimize harassment costs when facing multiple beggars. Further analysis is necessary to explore optimal amounts of food
that an owner should share with multiple beggars: should the
owner share one large piece to draw some of the beggars away,
or should it share small pieces with every beggar?
The optimal strategy of the beggars offers a challenge as
well. One can imagine multiple beggars in a situation similar
to that of a group of vigilant prey. Like the concept of corporate vigilance (Bertram, 1980), a beggar would probably benefit more from having additional beggars around to increase
chances of sharing. Packer and Abrams (1990) modeled vigilance situations and found that Nash equilibrium vigilance
levels were often lower than Pareto equilibrium (or co-operative optimum) vigilance levels. Similarly, food beggars are
tempted to cheat or not harass by relying on harassment by
others, thereby avoiding their own costs of harassment.
Summary
Using a game theoretical approach, we modeled the effects
of harassment on food sharing. Our model predicts that a nonfood owner should harass an owner when the nonowner can
gain benefits even in the absence of sharing. These non-contingent benefits (such as gathering dropped scraps) can recoup energetic costs of harassing. An owner should only share
when a beggar harasses, significantly reducing its consumption rate. Therefore, if an owner consumes the food slowly, a
beggar can harass for long periods of time, so the owner pays
high costs of defending. Experimentally manipulating parameters such as feeding rate, noncontingent benefits, resource divisibility, and number of beggars in a sharing context could
provide rigorous tests of our model.
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APPENDIX
The π(p) function and time available for harassment
Here we determine how the amount shared, As, influences the
time available for harassment. Because we assume that both
players feed at rate r, the owner consumes for time
while the beggar consumes for time

as long as n – 2m is positive. If not, the beggar has more food
than the owner, and it will continue eating even after the
owner has finished. So there is no time available for harassment (Th = 0) if m ≥ n/2. To find the expected time available
for harassment [E(Th)], we calculate the product of the time
available (Th) and the probability of m pieces being shared,
summed over every possible m. We use

as the binomial probability of sharing m pieces (Zar, 1996).

The difference

represents the time available for harassment, with the proviso that a negative value means zero time available for harassment (because the beggar spends longer eating than the
owner). If we let Th represent the time available for harassment, then we have
if
otherwise
Substituting this into Equation 1 suggests a π(p) function of
the form
if
otherwise

(A1)

so that Th = (A/r)π(p) as required. Figure 1 uses Equation A1
to plot π(p) as a function of the proportion shared p. Although
one might construct a model based on the “kinked” π (p) function (Figure 1) discussed above, it is both inconvenient and implausible. It is inconvenient because the discontinuity at p = .5
means that all remaining calculations must also take account
of this condition. It is implausible because stochastic variation
in consumption rates (r) and the amount shared (As) will combine to create smooth expected harassment time curve [E(Th)].
The next few paragraphs discuss one simple way to incorporate this stochasticity.
Resource divisibility and binomial sharing
Some resources divide easily into parts, whereas others cannot. Suppose that the resource in question can be divided into
n equal parts of size A/n. Now suppose that when the owner
chooses the proportion to share, p, it determines the probability of sharing each part. In this scenario the number of parts
shared is a random variable drawn from a binomial distribution with parameters p and n, where p represents the owner’s
willingness to share (p = As/A), and the n represents the divisibility of the resource.
The assumption that a binomial process governs sharing allows us to specify completely the expected time available for
harassment given the owner’s willingness to share, p. If the
owner shares m of the n parts, the owner retains amount

and the beggar obtains amount

Because we assume that both animals feed at the same rate
(r), the time available for harassment is the difference

(A2)
where the indicated portion of this expression is the π(p) function that we seek. Figure 1 shows this π(p) function for a range
of resource divisibilities (n values). The figure compares this
family of π(p) functions to the piecewise function (Equation
A1) obtained when we assume infinite divisibility and errorfree sharing. For indivisible resources (n = 1), π(p) is a straight
line [π(p) = 1 – p; Figure 1]. As resource divisibility increases,
π(p) approaches the piecewise function derived earlier (Equation A1; see Figure 1).
Although we cannot express π(p) in an algebraically convenient closed form, we can easily state the important properties
of π(p). The most important feature of π(p) is its derivative at
zero [π′ (0)]. Direct differentiation shows
if
if

(A3)

that is, the derivative at zero is –1 for indivisible resources and
–2 otherwise. Moreover, for divisible resources, the derivative
at p = 1 is zero [π′ (1) = 0]. In the indivisible case, π(p) = 1 – p, so
π′ (p) = –1 for all p. Finally, we observe that π(p) decreases with
p (technically, it is nonincreasing with p).
Index of variables
A
As
Bb
Bo
c
c*
ĉ
ECH
k
m
n
p
p*
p̂
r
t
Th
γ
π(p)

entire resource amount
amount owner shares with beggar
fitness benefits received by beggar
fitness benefits received by owner
intensity of harassment
maximum intensity of harassment
optimal intensity of harassment
efficiency of consumption when harassed
noncontingent benefits factor
number of discrete parts of resource shared by owner
total number of discrete parts of resource
proportion of total amount shared
proportion of total amount shared that is optimal reply to c*
optimal proportion of total amount shared
consumption rate
total harassment time
time available for harassment
effect of beggar’s harassment intensity on owner’s fitness
proportion of maximum consumption time that is available
for harassment when owner shares p proportion of food
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